Leadership Transitions and Survival: Coups, Autocoups, and Power Dynamics

Zhu Qi

2024-12-16

Contents

1. Main Questions

2. Main Contributions

3. Main Arguments

4. Main Findings

As Tobias suggested, I will present my thesis in four main parts: the main questions, main contributions, main arguments, and main findings.

If you need any explanations, please feel free to jump in.

1 Main Questions

  • Main Questions
  • Motivations

  • What factors influence whether political leaders are removed from power prematurely or succeed in extending their tenure beyond constitutional limits?

  • My research focuses on political survival, a widely discussed topic in political science. Since coups are the most common means of ousting leaders and autocoups the most significant way to extend their tenure, I concentrate on these two types of events.

  • The motivation for this study stems from the alarming decline of democracy and the rise of autocratization, alongside a notable decrease in classic coups and increase in autocoups since 2000.

  • According to Freedom House’s 2024 report, there has been an 18-year consecutive decline in global freedom.

  • Since 2000, the incidence of autocoups has surged, highlighted by prominent cases such as Putin in Russia (2008), Xi Jinping in China (2018), and the contentious debates regarding Donald Trump’s refusal to concede the 2020 election.

Alarming decline of democracy and rise of autocratization

  • 18-year consecutive decline in global freedom (Freedom House 2024)

Surge in autocoups since 2000

  • High-profile examples: Putin in Russia(2008), Xi Jinping in China(2018), and Trump in the US(2020)

Contents

1. Main Questions

2. Main Contributions

3. Main Arguments

4. Main Findings

2 Main Contributions

  • One
  • Two
  • Three

1. This study emphasizes the crucial role of power dynamics in determining coup and autocoup attempts, particularly focusing on how regime types shape these dynamics among power seekers.

  • By addressing the main questions, the study might contribute in three main ways.

  • Previous research on coups has analyzed the determinants of coup attempts in great detail, identifying approximately 100 factors, but remains no consensus. I propose that power dynamics, specifically the balance of power, is a crucial determinant of both coups and autocoups.

  • I coded 110 autocoup attempts and 87 of them succeeded from 1945 to 2023.

  • Previous studies on autocoups have primarily relied on case studies and often lack empirical analysis. Using the new data I introduced, I conducted a comparative analysis of leadership survival between coup-installed leaders and autocoup leaders.

2. This study refines the definition of autocoups and introduces a novel dataset, enabling both an empirical analysis of autocoups and a comparative examination alongside traditional coups.

3. This study conducts a novel comparative analysis of leadership survival between coup-installed leaders and autocoup leaders.

Contents

1. Main Questions

2. Main Contributions

3. Main Arguments

4. Main Findings

3 Main Arguments

  • Framework
  • One
  • Two
  • Three

Power Dynamics and Decision-Making Framework

1. Power dynamics—specifically, the balance of power between incumbents and challengers—significantly influence the potential outcomes of coups and autocoups, thereby affecting the likelihood of such attempts.

  • I hope this diagram will not be even more confusing.

  • Although the outcome of a coup is uncertain before it takes place, plotters must first assess their chances of success before deciding to act. Coup attempts are driven by an expectation of success—otherwise, plotters will abandon their plans or wait for a better opportunity. Then, what determines the success or failure of a coup? I argue that it depends on the balance of power between incumbents and challengers. However, the balance of power is often hidden and unobservable to outsiders. To address this, I propose using regime types as a proxy. Since regime types are shaped by the balance of power at the time of their establishment, they not only reflect this balance but also influence the likelihood of coup attempts.

  • In redefining autocoups, I observed that existing definitions are often vague and lack precision. First, they fail to clearly distinguish between power expansion and tenure extension. Second, these definitions make it difficult to analyze autocoups alongside classic coups in a systematic way.

  • There are many leaders who extend their tenure—some do so blatantly by violating the constitution, while others appear to comply with constitutional procedures or use referendums. However, in essence, these actions lack legitimacy, and I code all of them as autocoups.

2. Following the same logic of power dynamics, the method of power acquisition—which influences the balance of power among power challengers—significantly affects leadership survival.

3. Autocoups: Redefining and reclassifying autocoups to enable meaningful comparison with coups.

  • Focused on tenure extension rather than power expansion.
  • Any attempt by an incumbent leader to extend their own power, regardless of its legal pretense, is considered an autocoup.

Contents

1. Main Questions

2. Main Contributions

3. Main Arguments

4. Main Findings

4 Main Findings

  • One
  • Two
  • Three

1. Due to the imbalanced power dynamics among military officers internally, as well as their conflicts with civil servants externally, military regimes are the most coup-prone regime type, exhibiting a 277.7% higher likelihood of experiencing coups compared to dominant-party regimes.

2. Similarly, due to the concentration of power in the hands of dictators, personalist regimes are significantly more likely to carry out autocoups compared to other types of regimes.

Table 1: Coup Attempts by Regime Type Over time
Year Dominant-Party Personal Military Democracy Monarchy Other Total
1950 22 7 5 35 14 2 85
1951 22 8 4 35 15 2 86
1952 21 8 5 35 16 2 87
1953 24 10 4 34 16 1 89
1954 23 10 5 35 16 1 90
1955 22 12 4 36 16 1 91
1956 22 11 5 37 17 0 92
1957 23 9 4 39 17 2 94
1958 26 10 5 38 16 0 95
1959 26 12 5 38 15 1 97
1960 34 16 5 41 15 2 113
1961 33 15 7 45 15 2 117
1962 34 15 7 48 16 3 123
1963 36 14 9 47 15 4 125
1964 40 12 12 46 15 2 127
1965 43 13 12 44 15 4 131
1966 45 14 11 47 15 3 135
1967 47 14 13 45 15 3 137
1968 47 15 14 45 16 3 140
1969 48 15 15 44 16 2 140
1970 49 17 15 42 16 3 142
1971 51 20 13 41 18 3 146
1972 50 21 12 42 18 3 146
1973 49 22 16 40 18 2 147
1974 49 23 17 40 17 3 149
1975 52 22 20 42 16 4 156
1976 52 23 18 43 16 4 156
1977 52 24 20 42 16 3 157
1978 52 24 21 44 16 3 160
1979 54 23 19 49 16 4 165
1980 53 23 17 52 15 6 166
1981 51 25 20 56 15 3 170
1982 51 25 20 56 15 3 170
1983 51 27 18 58 15 2 171
1984 50 27 17 59 15 3 171
1985 49 28 16 61 15 2 171
1986 49 26 15 62 15 4 171
1987 48 25 16 64 15 3 171
1988 46 24 17 65 15 4 171
1989 46 24 15 68 15 3 171
1990 46 27 11 76 15 5 180
1991 43 28 10 82 15 9 187
1992 39 26 10 91 14 9 189
1993 37 26 10 95 14 8 190
1994 36 25 6 101 14 8 190
1995 33 25 4 105 14 9 190
1996 33 25 4 106 14 8 190
1997 35 27 4 104 14 6 190
1998 35 29 5 102 14 5 190
1999 35 29 3 103 14 6 190
2000 32 29 5 105 14 5 190
2001 29 28 5 109 14 5 190
2002 28 28 5 111 14 5 191
2003 27 28 5 111 15 5 191
2004 27 26 4 109 15 10 191
2005 27 25 4 110 15 10 191
2006 27 25 4 113 15 8 192
2007 26 25 5 116 14 6 192
2008 26 25 5 118 14 6 194
2009 26 24 5 121 13 5 194
2010 26 25 4 120 13 6 194
2011 26 25 3 120 13 8 195
2012 25 23 2 124 13 8 195
2013 25 23 2 124 13 8 195
2014 25 22 2 124 13 9 195
2015 25 20 3 127 13 7 195
2016 25 20 3 128 13 6 195
2017 25 20 3 128 13 6 195
2018 26 19 3 129 13 5 195
2019 25 18 3 130 13 5 194
2020 25 17 3 128 13 8 194

3. Challenges associated with illegitimacy, uncertainty, and instability tend to favour autocoup leaders, enabling them to enjoy significantly longer post-event tenures. In contrast, coup-installed leaders are 2.23 times more likely to be ousted.

  • The thesis has three main findings.

  • These two findings offer a straightforward explanation for the decline in classic coups and the rise of autocoups since 2000: the changing structure of regime types. Specifically, the number of military regimes has declined significantly since 1994, while personalist regimes have remained relatively stable. Although dominant-party regimes have changed significantly, they play a relatively insignificant role in coups and autocoups.

Thank you.

Ok, that’s my paper. Thank you for your valuable feedback and comments.

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Leadership Transitions and Survival: Coups, Autocoups, and Power Dynamics Zhu Qi 2024-12-16

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  • Leadership Transitions and Survival: Coups, Autocoups, and Power Dynamics
  • Contents
  • 1 Main Questions
  • Contents
  • 2 Main Contributions
  • Contents
  • 3 Main Arguments
  • Contents
  • 4 Main Findings
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