Leadership Transitions and Survival: Coups, Autocoups, and Power Dynamics

Zhu Qi

2024-12-16

Contents

1. Main Questions

2. Main Contributions

3. Main Arguments

4. Main Findings

As Tobias suggested, I will present my thesis in four main parts: the main questions, main contributions, main arguments, and main findings.

If you need any explanations, please feel free to jump in.

1 Main Questions

• Main Questions
• Motivations

• What factors influence whether political leaders are removed from power prematurely or succeed in extending their tenure beyond constitutional limits?

• My research focuses on political survival, a widely discussed topic in political science. Since coups are the most common means of ousting leaders and autocoups the most significant way to extend their tenure, I concentrate on these two types of events.

• The motivation for this study stems from the alarming decline of democracy and the rise of autocratization, alongside a notable decrease in classic coups and increase in autocoups since 2000.

• According to Freedom House’s 2024 report, there has been an 18-year consecutive decline in global freedom.

• Since 2000, the incidence of autocoups has surged, highlighted by prominent cases such as Putin in Russia (2008), Xi Jinping in China (2018), and the contentious debates regarding Donald Trump’s refusal to concede the 2020 election.

Alarming decline of democracy and rise of autocratization

• 18-year consecutive decline in global freedom (Freedom House 2024)

Surge in autocoups since 2000

• High-profile examples: Putin in Russia(2008), Xi Jinping in China(2018), and Trump in the US(2020)

Contents

1. Main Questions

2. Main Contributions

3. Main Arguments

4. Main Findings

2 Main Contributions

• One
• Two
• Three

1. This study emphasizes the crucial role of power dynamics in determining coup and autocoup attempts, particularly focusing on how regime types shape these dynamics among power seekers.

• By addressing the main questions, the study might contribute in three main ways.

• Previous research on coups has analyzed the determinants of coup attempts in great detail, identifying approximately 100 factors, but remains no consensus. I propose that power dynamics, specifically the balance of power, is a crucial determinant of both coups and autocoups.

• I coded 110 autocoup attempts and 87 of them succeeded from 1945 to 2023.

• Previous studies on autocoups have primarily relied on case studies and often lack empirical analysis. Using the new data I introduced, I conducted a comparative analysis of leadership survival between coup-installed leaders and autocoup leaders.

2. This study refines the definition of autocoups and introduces a novel dataset, enabling both an empirical analysis of autocoups and a comparative examination alongside traditional coups.

3. This study conducts a novel comparative analysis of leadership survival between coup-installed leaders and autocoup leaders.

Contents

1. Main Questions

2. Main Contributions

3. Main Arguments

4. Main Findings

3 Main Arguments

• Framework
• One
• Two
• Three

Power Dynamics and Decision-Making Framework

1. Power dynamics—specifically, the balance of power between incumbents and challengers—significantly influence the potential outcomes of coups and autocoups, thereby affecting the likelihood of such attempts.

• I hope this diagram will not be even more confusing.

• Although the outcome of a coup is uncertain before it takes place, plotters must first assess their chances of success before deciding to act. Coup attempts are driven by an expectation of success—otherwise, plotters will abandon their plans or wait for a better opportunity. Then, what determines the success or failure of a coup? I argue that it depends on the balance of power between incumbents and challengers. However, the balance of power is often hidden and unobservable to outsiders. To address this, I propose using regime types as a proxy. Since regime types are shaped by the balance of power at the time of their establishment, they not only reflect this balance but also influence the likelihood of coup attempts.

• In redefining autocoups, I observed that existing definitions are often vague and lack precision. First, they fail to clearly distinguish between power expansion and tenure extension. Second, these definitions make it difficult to analyze autocoups alongside classic coups in a systematic way.

• There are many leaders who extend their tenure—some do so blatantly by violating the constitution, while others appear to comply with constitutional procedures or use referendums. However, in essence, these actions lack legitimacy, and I code all of them as autocoups.

2. Following the same logic of power dynamics, the method of power acquisition—which influences the balance of power among power challengers—significantly affects leadership survival.

3. Autocoups: Redefining and reclassifying autocoups to enable meaningful comparison with coups.

• Focused on tenure extension rather than power expansion.
• Any attempt by an incumbent leader to extend their own power, regardless of its legal pretense, is considered an autocoup.

Contents

1. Main Questions

2. Main Contributions

3. Main Arguments

4. Main Findings

4 Main Findings

• One
• Two
• Three

1. Due to the imbalanced power dynamics among military officers internally, as well as their conflicts with civil servants externally, military regimes are the most coup-prone regime type, exhibiting a 277.7% higher likelihood of experiencing coups compared to dominant-party regimes.

2. Similarly, due to the concentration of power in the hands of dictators, personalist regimes are significantly more likely to carry out autocoups compared to other types of regimes.

Table 1: Coup Attempts by Regime Type Over time

Year	Dominant-Party	Personal	Military	Democracy	Monarchy	Other	Total
1950	22	7	5	35	14	2	85
1951	22	8	4	35	15	2	86
1952	21	8	5	35	16	2	87
1953	24	10	4	34	16	1	89
1954	23	10	5	35	16	1	90
1955	22	12	4	36	16	1	91
1956	22	11	5	37	17	0	92
1957	23	9	4	39	17	2	94
1958	26	10	5	38	16	0	95
1959	26	12	5	38	15	1	97
1960	34	16	5	41	15	2	113
1961	33	15	7	45	15	2	117
1962	34	15	7	48	16	3	123
1963	36	14	9	47	15	4	125
1964	40	12	12	46	15	2	127
1965	43	13	12	44	15	4	131
1966	45	14	11	47	15	3	135
1967	47	14	13	45	15	3	137
1968	47	15	14	45	16	3	140
1969	48	15	15	44	16	2	140
1970	49	17	15	42	16	3	142
1971	51	20	13	41	18	3	146
1972	50	21	12	42	18	3	146
1973	49	22	16	40	18	2	147
1974	49	23	17	40	17	3	149
1975	52	22	20	42	16	4	156
1976	52	23	18	43	16	4	156
1977	52	24	20	42	16	3	157
1978	52	24	21	44	16	3	160
1979	54	23	19	49	16	4	165
1980	53	23	17	52	15	6	166
1981	51	25	20	56	15	3	170
1982	51	25	20	56	15	3	170
1983	51	27	18	58	15	2	171
1984	50	27	17	59	15	3	171
1985	49	28	16	61	15	2	171
1986	49	26	15	62	15	4	171
1987	48	25	16	64	15	3	171
1988	46	24	17	65	15	4	171
1989	46	24	15	68	15	3	171
1990	46	27	11	76	15	5	180
1991	43	28	10	82	15	9	187
1992	39	26	10	91	14	9	189
1993	37	26	10	95	14	8	190
1994	36	25	6	101	14	8	190
1995	33	25	4	105	14	9	190
1996	33	25	4	106	14	8	190
1997	35	27	4	104	14	6	190
1998	35	29	5	102	14	5	190
1999	35	29	3	103	14	6	190
2000	32	29	5	105	14	5	190
2001	29	28	5	109	14	5	190
2002	28	28	5	111	14	5	191
2003	27	28	5	111	15	5	191
2004	27	26	4	109	15	10	191
2005	27	25	4	110	15	10	191
2006	27	25	4	113	15	8	192
2007	26	25	5	116	14	6	192
2008	26	25	5	118	14	6	194
2009	26	24	5	121	13	5	194
2010	26	25	4	120	13	6	194
2011	26	25	3	120	13	8	195
2012	25	23	2	124	13	8	195
2013	25	23	2	124	13	8	195
2014	25	22	2	124	13	9	195
2015	25	20	3	127	13	7	195
2016	25	20	3	128	13	6	195
2017	25	20	3	128	13	6	195
2018	26	19	3	129	13	5	195
2019	25	18	3	130	13	5	194
2020	25	17	3	128	13	8	194

3. Challenges associated with illegitimacy, uncertainty, and instability tend to favour autocoup leaders, enabling them to enjoy significantly longer post-event tenures. In contrast, coup-installed leaders are 2.23 times more likely to be ousted.

• The thesis has three main findings.

• These two findings offer a straightforward explanation for the decline in classic coups and the rise of autocoups since 2000: the changing structure of regime types. Specifically, the number of military regimes has declined significantly since 1994, while personalist regimes have remained relatively stable. Although dominant-party regimes have changed significantly, they play a relatively insignificant role in coups and autocoups.

Thank you.

Ok, that’s my paper. Thank you for your valuable feedback and comments.